opposing the resource crowley. what type of resource is he, and who does he represent? i try to be nice, but most people say im not, so i could not be a resource on being nice. if you are trying to understand, you dont belong as a resource.
Lore Menin
Kihei Resident
Owner Occupant in a STVR
Aloha, I do not oppose tax relief or the original intent of Bill 142; I oppose advancing the bill in its current form because the CD1 materially changes its purpose, weakens housing outcomes, and severs alignment with Bill 9 implementation. Please see the attached testimony. Thank you.
I will forego offering views on how fair, unfair, vindictive, confiscatory, or prejudicial the proposed real property tax reform bill may be. The Council majority has made its intentions clear in passing Bill 9, so I will not waste my time.
However, what must be noted is that the proposed differential treatement based on "how long" someone has been a resident is blatantly unconstitutional, will be challenged in the federal (not state) courts, and will be struck down. Reasonable minds can disagree on most anything, but fully informed reasonable minds cannot disagree on that conclusion. Please ask County Counsel to review and advise before stepping off this cliff.
I am not going to do the leg work for the committee, but it might start with Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). See at https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/457/55.html#:~:text=Appellants%2C%20residents%20of%20Alaska%20since%201978%2C%20brought%20this%20suit%20in,2. Although Zobel v. Williams involved a particular benefit, the language in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court was sweeping, based on the 14th Amendment equal protection clause. The Court held that "Alaska's reasoning could open the door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits, and services according to length of residency, and would [457 U.S. 55, 56] permit the states to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes. Such a result would be clearly impermissible."
Modest residence requirements up to one year to qualify for state benefits may pass muster under some circumstances. Providing unequal treatment of residents based on whether they have been residents for 1, 5, or 10 years does not pass muster.
See also, Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986). See at https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/476/898.html#:~:text=%5B%20Footnote%202%20%5D%20As%20was%20observed,As%20we%20explained%20in%20Martinez: in which the U.S. Supreme Court explained, in no uncertain terms:
A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, see, e. g., Crandall v. Nevada, supra, at 46; see also Shapiro, supra, at 629, when impeding travel is its primary objective, see Zobel, supra, at 62, n. 9; Shapiro, supra, at 628-631, or when it uses "`any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.'" Dunn, supra, at 340 (quoting Shapiro, supra, at 634). Our right-to-migrate cases have principally involved the latter, indirect manner of burdening the right. More particularly, our recent cases have dealt with state laws that, by classifying residents according to the time they established residence, resulted in the unequal distribution of rights and benefits among otherwise qualified bona fide residents. 3 Hooper, [476 U.S. 898, 904] supra; Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Memorial Hospital, supra; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro, supra.
Because the creation of different classes of residents raises equal protection concerns, we have also relied upon the Equal Protection Clause in these cases. Whenever a state law infringes a constitutionally protected right, we undertake intensified equal protection scrutiny of that law. See, e. g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 , n. 7 (1983); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 -217, and n. 15 (1982); Memorial Hospital, supra, at 258, 262; San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 , and n. 39, 30-32, 40 (1973); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972); Dunn, supra, at 335, 342; Shapiro, supra, at 634. Thus, in several cases, we asked expressly whether the distinction drawn by the State between older and newer residents burdens the right to migrate. Where we found such a burden, we required the State to come forward with a compelling justification. See, e. g., Shapiro v. Thompson, supra; Dunn, supra; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). In other cases, where we concluded that the contested classifications did not survive even rational-basis scrutiny, we had no occasion to inquire whether enhanced scrutiny was appropriate. Hooper, supra; Zobel, supra. The analysis in all of these cases, however, is informed by the same guiding principle - the right to migrate protects residents of a State from being disadvantaged, or from being treated differently, simply because of the timing of their migration, from other similarly situated residents. 4 Hooper, [476 U.S. 898, 905] supra, at 618, n. 6; Zobel, supra, at 60, n. 6; Memorial Hospital, supra, at 261; Shapiro, supra, at 629-631.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that the County may not do what has been proposed. It is so blatantly unconstitutional that I would expect a U.S. district Court to grant injunctive relief while it fully plays out. The County should not waste limited resources litigating over new legislation that has no chance of surviving judicial review.
Committee Members - for the 2025-2026 tax year many of us have already paid our property taxes that were calculated using higher STR or Second Home rates. In addition, those that may not have, must pay within the next month. Please add language allowing this to apply to this current tax bill. That way those of us that have already paid can’t request refunds for the difference between the taxes paid and the taxes if it had been calculated as a homestead.
opposing the resource crowley. what type of resource is he, and who does he represent? i try to be nice, but most people say im not, so i could not be a resource on being nice. if you are trying to understand, you dont belong as a resource.
Lore Menin
Kihei Resident
Owner Occupant in a STVR
Aloha, I do not oppose tax relief or the original intent of Bill 142; I oppose advancing the bill in its current form because the CD1 materially changes its purpose, weakens housing outcomes, and severs alignment with Bill 9 implementation. Please see the attached testimony. Thank you.
I will forego offering views on how fair, unfair, vindictive, confiscatory, or prejudicial the proposed real property tax reform bill may be. The Council majority has made its intentions clear in passing Bill 9, so I will not waste my time.
However, what must be noted is that the proposed differential treatement based on "how long" someone has been a resident is blatantly unconstitutional, will be challenged in the federal (not state) courts, and will be struck down. Reasonable minds can disagree on most anything, but fully informed reasonable minds cannot disagree on that conclusion. Please ask County Counsel to review and advise before stepping off this cliff.
I am not going to do the leg work for the committee, but it might start with Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). See at https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/457/55.html#:~:text=Appellants%2C%20residents%20of%20Alaska%20since%201978%2C%20brought%20this%20suit%20in,2. Although Zobel v. Williams involved a particular benefit, the language in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court was sweeping, based on the 14th Amendment equal protection clause. The Court held that "Alaska's reasoning could open the door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits, and services according to length of residency, and would [457 U.S. 55, 56] permit the states to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent classes. Such a result would be clearly impermissible."
Modest residence requirements up to one year to qualify for state benefits may pass muster under some circumstances. Providing unequal treatment of residents based on whether they have been residents for 1, 5, or 10 years does not pass muster.
See also, Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986). See at https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/476/898.html#:~:text=%5B%20Footnote%202%20%5D%20As%20was%20observed,As%20we%20explained%20in%20Martinez: in which the U.S. Supreme Court explained, in no uncertain terms:
A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, see, e. g., Crandall v. Nevada, supra, at 46; see also Shapiro, supra, at 629, when impeding travel is its primary objective, see Zobel, supra, at 62, n. 9; Shapiro, supra, at 628-631, or when it uses "`any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.'" Dunn, supra, at 340 (quoting Shapiro, supra, at 634). Our right-to-migrate cases have principally involved the latter, indirect manner of burdening the right. More particularly, our recent cases have dealt with state laws that, by classifying residents according to the time they established residence, resulted in the unequal distribution of rights and benefits among otherwise qualified bona fide residents. 3 Hooper, [476 U.S. 898, 904] supra; Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Memorial Hospital, supra; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro, supra.
Because the creation of different classes of residents raises equal protection concerns, we have also relied upon the Equal Protection Clause in these cases. Whenever a state law infringes a constitutionally protected right, we undertake intensified equal protection scrutiny of that law. See, e. g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 , n. 7 (1983); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 -217, and n. 15 (1982); Memorial Hospital, supra, at 258, 262; San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 , and n. 39, 30-32, 40 (1973); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972); Dunn, supra, at 335, 342; Shapiro, supra, at 634. Thus, in several cases, we asked expressly whether the distinction drawn by the State between older and newer residents burdens the right to migrate. Where we found such a burden, we required the State to come forward with a compelling justification. See, e. g., Shapiro v. Thompson, supra; Dunn, supra; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). In other cases, where we concluded that the contested classifications did not survive even rational-basis scrutiny, we had no occasion to inquire whether enhanced scrutiny was appropriate. Hooper, supra; Zobel, supra. The analysis in all of these cases, however, is informed by the same guiding principle - the right to migrate protects residents of a State from being disadvantaged, or from being treated differently, simply because of the timing of their migration, from other similarly situated residents. 4 Hooper, [476 U.S. 898, 905] supra, at 618, n. 6; Zobel, supra, at 60, n. 6; Memorial Hospital, supra, at 261; Shapiro, supra, at 629-631.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that the County may not do what has been proposed. It is so blatantly unconstitutional that I would expect a U.S. district Court to grant injunctive relief while it fully plays out. The County should not waste limited resources litigating over new legislation that has no chance of surviving judicial review.
Committee Members - for the 2025-2026 tax year many of us have already paid our property taxes that were calculated using higher STR or Second Home rates. In addition, those that may not have, must pay within the next month. Please add language allowing this to apply to this current tax bill. That way those of us that have already paid can’t request refunds for the difference between the taxes paid and the taxes if it had been calculated as a homestead.
Thank you
Brandon Harris
5126267399
Bharris3880@gmail.com